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REFORMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROBLEM:  THE CONSENSUS REQUIREMENT 
Suja A. Thomas* 
 
If one or more federal trial or appellate court judges disagree on whether 
summary judgment should be ordered, summary judgment can still be 
granted when an appellate majority finds in favor of summary judgment.  The 
case will be dismissed, and a jury will not try it.  Logically, however, should 
this occur?  At least one judge has stated that a reasonable jury could find 
for the party against whom summary judgment has been ordered.  In these 
situations where judges disagree on whether summary judgment should be 
granted, they often portray the case’s facts in very different ways—what I 
refer to as “massaging facts.”  The massaging of facts, along with the issues 
of summary judgment’s unconstitutionality and the underlying reasonable 
jury standard’s impossibility, make summary judgment legally problematic.  
At the same time, courts extensively employ summary judgment to 
dismiss many factually intensive cases, including police brutality and sexual 
harassment cases.  Given that summary judgment has no prospect of 
being eliminated any time soon, the question is whether the “summary 
judgment problem” can be reformed to make the procedure more defensible.  
This Article explains the summary judgment problem including the concept 
of massaging facts.  It then analyzes “the consensus requirement”—an 
effort to make summary judgment more justifiable given its continued use 
today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston,1 the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari for a case alleging the police exercised excessive force.2  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated:  “Every year the courts of appeals 
decide hundreds of cases in which they must determine whether thin evidence 
provided by a plaintiff is just enough to survive a motion for summary 
judgment or not quite enough.”3  He concluded that the Court “does not 
typically grant . . . certiorari to review a factual question of this sort.”4  The 
question of whether a plaintiff has sufficient evidence to defeat summary 
judgment is an important one, however.  The fates of people who allege 
wrongs often rest on these determinations. 
Salazar-Limon was one of the people who relied on the courts to make the 
correct decision.  The police pulled him over after they observed his car 
weaving in traffic on a freeway.5  Later, some time after he was out of the car 
pursuant to a police officer’s request, one of the police officers shot the 
unarmed Salazar-Limon in the back claiming that he reached at his waistband 
for a gun.6  Subsequently, Salazar-Limon brought a case alleging the police 
exercised excessive force in using a gun against him.7  Examining the case 
on a motion by the police officer for summary judgment, the district court 
and court of appeals judges agreed with the police officer that a reasonable 
jury could not find that the officer exercised excessive force.  They asserted 
the facts were undisputed that the motorist reached for his waistband.8  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court decided not to grant certiorari.9  Citing differing 
factual contentions on whether the motorist had reached for his waistband, 
Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Ginsburg joining her, stated, “This is not a 
case that should have been resolved on summary judgment.”10 
In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, judges decide whether a 
genuine dispute of material fact exists and, if there is no such dispute, they 
decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.11  
The Supreme Court has stated that a judge can decide whether summary 
judgment should be granted by determining whether a reasonable jury could 
 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017). 
 2. Id. at 1278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue before the Court involved 
the use of excessive force). 
 3. Id. at 1277 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 4. Id. at 1278. 
 5. Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 97 F. Supp. 3d 898, 900 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 
826 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017). 
 6. Id. at 901–02. 
 7. Id. at 902. 
 8. Salazar-Limon, 826 F.3d at 278–79; Salazar-Limon, 97 F. Supp. 3d. at 907. 
 9. Salazar-Limon, 137 S. Ct. at 1277 (denying certiorari). 
 10. Id. at 1280 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
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decide for the nonmoving party.12  The Supreme Court has never undertaken 
to explain how a judge can make this determination. 
When the standard was created, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. actually 
questioned how a judge could decide this question.13  In the past, using these 
criticisms as a starting point, I described the impossibility of the reasonable 
jury standard, showing judges cannot determine what a jury could decide.14  
Instead, we see judges infuse their own opinions of the evidence in 
determining whether to grant summary judgment,15 something that the 
Supreme Court has explicitly stated judges should not do when deciding 
whether to order summary judgment.16 
The source of the disagreement in Salazar-Limon was the key fact of 
whether the motorist had reached for his waistband.17  Although all of the 
Justices and judges had the same information, they described the facts 
differently, which resulted in disparate decisions both for and against 
summary judgment.  First, some judges ignored certain alleged facts.  
Second, although judges are supposed to resolve reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party,18 some judges represented the facts in a 
manner favorable to the moving party.  This altered portrayal of the facts in 
judicial opinions is referred to here as the “massaging of the facts.” 
Salazar-Limon was just one of many civil rights cases that have been 
dismissed on summary judgment.  These types of cases—some of the most 
factually intensive cases—are dismissed at very high rates.19 
Summary judgment in these cases occurs in the presence of the Seventh 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  This provision preserved the right to a 
jury trial in civil cases that existed at English common law in the late 
eighteenth century.20  At English common law, juries decided cases with 
damages, and judges had extremely limited authority to dismiss cases before, 
 
 12. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). 
 13. See id. at 257–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 14. See generally Suja A. Thomas, Summary Judgment and the Reasonable Jury 
Standard:  A Proxy for a Judge’s Own View of the Sufficiency of the Evidence?, 97 
JUDICATURE 222 (2014) [hereinafter Thomas, Proxy]; Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of 
Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759 (2009) [hereinafter Thomas, Fallacy]. 
 15. See generally Thomas, Proxy, supra note 14 (arguing that the reasonable jury standard 
has become a proxy for the judge’s own view of the evidence); Thomas, Fallacy, supra note 
14 (arguing that judges substitute their views for those of a reasonable jury). 
 16. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). 
 17. Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“Indeed, the courts below needed to ask only one question:  Did Salazar-Limon 
turn and reach for his waistband, or not?”). 
 18. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255 (majority opinion). 
 19. See Amanda Farahany & Tanya McAdams, Analysis of Employment Discrimination 
Claims for Cases in Which an Order Was Issued on Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment in 2011 and 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
(unpublished manuscript) (Sept. 18, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2326697 [https://perma.cc/RE79-865B]; see also Memorandum from Joe Cecil 
& George Cort to Hon. Michael Baylson, Estimates of Summary Judgment Activity in Fiscal 
Year 2006 (June 15, 2007), https://www.fjc.gov/content/estimates-summary-judgment-
activity-fiscal-year-2006 [https://perma.cc/DW66-3XRK]. 
 20. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 
146–47 (2007). 
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during, or after a jury trial.21  No procedure similar to summary judgment 
existed whereby a court could dismiss a case based on what it thought the 
jury could find in the case.22 
Despite this history, summary judgment is entrenched in the civil system 
in the United States.  Moreover, seemingly irrational results can occur on 
summary judgment.  Despite one or more judges’ belief that a reasonable jury 
could find for party A, a court can grant summary judgment to party B, 
denying a jury trial to A. 
An important question is whether this system where summary judgment is 
granted under troubling conditions can be reformed.  Elsewhere, I briefly 
proposed the idea of the consensus requirement for summary judgment.23  
Here, this concept is further developed.  Under this requirement, if one judge 
decides a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party, summary 
judgment will be denied.24  The arguably unconstitutional nature of the 
procedure, the impossibility of implementing the underlying standard for 
summary judgment, and the massaging of facts that can occur each and 
together show that cases should go forward where at least one judge decides 
a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. 
Part I of this Article briefly traces the history of summary judgment.  Part 
II then describes the summary judgment problem.  It outlines my previous 
arguments that summary judgment is unconstitutional and that the reasonable 
jury standard is impossible.  The concept of massaging facts is then 
introduced using Salazar-Limon and other cases.  Finally, Part III describes 
the consensus requirement, an idea to reform summary judgment. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The English first introduced a procedure called “summary judgment” in 
Keating’s Act in 1855.25  This device permitted plaintiffs to secure a 
judgment without delay when defendants had no defense to a claim of debt.26  
The result of “economic and social pressures that could be withstood no 
longer,” the procedure was specifically favored by merchants.27  Because 
some debtors claimed false defenses to delay paying creditors such as 
merchants, Parliament sought to protect creditors through the creation of this 
 
 21. See id. at 148–58. 
 22. See id. 
 23. SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY:  RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 237 (2016) [hereinafter 
THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY]; Suja A. Thomas, What Happened to the American 
Jury?  Proposals for Revamping Plea Bargaining and Summary Judgment, LITIGATION, Spring 
2017, at 25, 29–30 [hereinafter Thomas, What Happened to the American Jury?]. 
 24. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY, supra note 23, at 237; Thomas, What 
Happened to the American Jury?, supra note 23, at 29–30. 
 25. John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure:  An Essay 
Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating’s Act, 31 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1956). 
 26. Id. at 342. 
 27. Id. at 329. 
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procedure.28  A court could decide whether the debtors set forth genuine 
defenses, requiring a trial.29 
In adopting this summary judgment procedure, the English drew on a long 
history of the use of similar procedures in other countries, including the use 
of summary diligence in Scotland.30  Parliament later extended summary 
judgment to other types of actions.31  However, certain causes of action 
including personal injury were not eligible for summary judgment because 
summary judgment required “factual clarity and proof.”32  Accordingly, 
summary judgment was possible only “with a written instrument 
documenting debt, or actions for a fixed amount of money.”33 
Summary judgment in the United States had significant similarities to as 
well as some differences from English summary judgment.34  There were 
parallels to the English’s reaction to the wishes of the mercantile; “the needs 
of the [American] commercial community and the ineptitude of the ordinary 
procedure to satisfy them” were emphasized.35  States limited their use to the 
use in England.36 
At the same time, in the federal courts, summary judgment was 
significantly motivated by desires to improve the fate of the plaintiff when 
corporations wielded too much power.37  Claiming injuries, plaintiffs brought 
actions against them and they in turn sought to delay cases to pressure 
monetarily challenged plaintiffs.38  Around the time that summary judgment 
was adopted, it took four years to complete a lawsuit.39 
When the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
considered summary judgment for the federal courts, they debated which 
causes of actions should not be dismissed via this mechanism.40  While it was 
acknowledged that summary judgment might not be appropriate in many tort 
cases because of the factually intensive nature of those cases, it was argued 
that the simple availability of summary judgment for tort cases could not hurt 
the vast majority of these cases for which summary judgment would not be 
appropriate.41 
 
 28. Id. at 333–34. 
 29. Id. at 338–39. 
 30. Id. at 334–37. 
 31. Id. at 339–40. 
 32. Ilana Haramati, Procedural History:  The Development of Summary Judgment as Rule 
56, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 173, 179 (2010); see also Bauman, supra note 25, at 340–41. 
 33. Haramati, supra note 32, at 178. 
 34. See Bauman, supra note 25, at 342–44. 
 35. Id. at 343–44. 
 36. Id. at 344–45.  Before its adoption in the federal courts, some states had summary 
judgment procedures and some permitted summary judgment for defendants. Id. at 344 & 
n.115. 
 37. Haramati, supra note 32, at 185–89. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 188. 
 40. Id. at 195–97. 
 41. Id. at 197. 
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In discussing the procedure’s use, some questioned whether the procedure 
was constitutional under the Seventh Amendment.42  Relatedly, in explaining 
the limits of the procedure, Advisory Committee members opined that juries 
should decide all factual issues.43 
Rule 56, adopted along with the other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938, expanded the grant of summary judgment to defendants and to all types 
of cases.44  The broadening of summary judgment resulted from a desire to 
make the federal courts more efficient.45  Edson Sunderland, one of the 
drafters of Rule 56, discussed the appropriate use of summary judgment:  
“‘[T]here is no reason for restricting [summary judgment rules] to any type 
of case’ as ‘[t]hey will tend to be used . . . only in appropriate cases.’”46  
However, potential problems with the broad change in the scope of summary 
judgment were recognized early on.  It was argued that the procedure 
encouraged courts to evaluate evidence and dismiss certain cases that juries 
should instead decide based on their assessments of witness demeanor and 
credibility.47 
II.  THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROBLEM 
In England, summary judgment initially served as a method where courts 
could evaluate whether a defendant possessed a real defense to a plaintiff’s 
claim of debt.48  In the United States, it was extended to be available for all 
claims and to permit defendants to bring summary judgment requests as 
well.49 
While, as described above, motions for summary judgment were originally 
considered inappropriate in most tort-type cases in the United States and were 
granted only where no issue of fact existed,50 currently, such motions are 
actually granted often in tort-type cases such as factually intensive civil rights 
cases.51  Also, contrary to the original procedure employed only in favor of 
plaintiffs, now courts often grant summary judgment against plaintiffs and 
almost never grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.52  A study by 
the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) illustrates these phenomena.53  The FJC 
studied motions for summary judgment.54  In the tort-type cases alleging 
employment discrimination, where defendant employers requested summary 
judgment, courts granted summary judgment for the defendant in full or in 
 
 42. Id. at 197–99.  
 43. Id. at 198–99. 
 44. Bauman, supra note 25, at 344; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 45. Haramati, supra note 32, at 202. 
 46. Id. at 205. 
 47. Bauman, supra note 25, at 351. 
 48. Thomas, supra note 20, at 179 n.167; see also supra notes 25–26 and accompanying 
text. 
 49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 51. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, supra note 19, at 2. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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part over 70 percent of the time.55  Another study of employment 
discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia found worse results 
for plaintiffs.56  In that study, where plaintiffs were represented and 
defendant-employers requested summary judgment, courts granted summary 
judgment for the defendants in around 80 percent of cases where plaintiffs 
alleged discrimination.57 
Previously, I showed summary judgment’s conflict with the Seventh 
Amendment and the irrationality of the underlying reasonable jury 
standard.58  In addition, in many cases in which courts grant summary 
judgment, judges describe the facts, creating an impression that no dispute of 
fact exists when such differences exist.  Each of these issues alone and 
together present “the summary judgment problem” in federal courts. 
A.  The Constitutional Problem 
Summary judgment precludes a jury from hearing a case.  So, the Seventh 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which gives certain authority to juries 
and other power to judges,59 determines whether summary judgment is 
constitutional.  It provides: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.60 
The Supreme Court has stated that common law in the Seventh Amendment 
means the English common law in 1791, the date when the Seventh 
Amendment was adopted.61  In other words, a right to a jury trial in the 
federal courts exists where a jury trial in England existed in the late 
eighteenth century. 
The English jury decided cases in which plaintiffs claimed damages, and 
judges had little control over jury verdicts.62  Prior to and during trial, a panel 
of three judges could rule respectively on a demurrer to the pleadings or a 
demurrer to the evidence under which a party argued the other party had no 
claim or defense that the law recognized.63  The demurring party accepted as 
true the alleged facts, evidence, and conclusions of the opposing party.64  
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally Farahany & McAdams, supra note 19. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. See generally Thomas, supra note 20. 
 59. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 n.20 (1996); 
Markham v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Galloway v. United States, 
319 U.S. 372, 388–92 (1943); Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656–57 
(1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476–77 (1935); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin 
Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497–98 (1931); Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 
(1913); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Thomas, supra note 20, at 148–58. 
 63. See id. at 148–54. 
 64. Id. at 149–51. 
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Prior to, during, or after a trial, a court could not decide that the claim was 
supported by insufficient evidence and dismiss the claim.65  During the trial, 
a judge had additional authority.  It could direct a jury to find in a certain 
way, but the jury could refuse to follow the judge’s admonition.66  After a 
jury trial, a court of three judges could order a new trial before another jury 
if they thought insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict.67  They 
could not however order judgment for the party that lost before the jury.68  
Under these common law procedures, juries or the parties determined the 
facts, and only after a trial could judges determine whether insufficient 
evidence supported the verdict, and if so, they could order only a new trial 
before another jury.69  If the second jury agreed with the first, the judges 
would not order a third jury trial.70 
As a result of principles derived from the common law procedures, in the 
past I concluded that summary judgment was unconstitutional.71  A 
counterargument that summary judgment is constitutional rests on England’s 
use of summary judgment.  Because England had a form of summary 
judgment72 and currently has a procedure of summary judgment that permits 
a court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence,73 American summary 
judgment is arguably constitutional because the American jury is based on 
the English jury.74 
However, the American jury is based specifically on the English jury in 
the late eighteenth century, not the English jury in the mid-nineteenth century 
or now.75  Furthermore, unlike Congress, Parliament had and has the power 
to alter the jurisdiction of the English courts and the jury.76  The jurisdiction 
of the jury in the federal courts is based on only the Constitution and 
consequently the English jury in the late eighteenth century.77  The jury’s 
authority can change only upon a constitutional amendment.78 
While there are circumstances when a court could constitutionally grant 
summary judgment, for example, if the parties actually agree to the facts and 
the judge simply applies the law to the facts, this type of application is not 
 
 65. Id. at 150, 153. 
 66. Id. at 156–57. 
 67. Id. at 157–58. 
 68. Id. at 158. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. (“If the court believed that the evidence was insufficient it would order a new 
trial.  The court would never order judgment.”). 
 71. Id. at 158–60. 
 72. Id. at 158. 
 73. CPR 24.2 (UK), https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/ 
part24 [https://perma.cc/ADJ9-9D3F]. 
 74. See Thomas, What Happened to the American Jury?, supra note 23, at 25. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress:  “In Suits at Common Law,” 71 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1071, 1102–03 (2010). 
 77. See id. at 1102–06. 
 78. See id. at 1104–06. 
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the usual situation.79  And this factual agreement does not occur in the 
factually disputed cases in which courts most often order summary 
judgment.80 
The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether summary 
judgment is unconstitutional.81  In the event, however, that lower courts 
believe that the Supreme Court has resolved this issue, the lower courts can 
revisit it.82  With that stated, this issue is unlikely to be addressed by the 
Supreme Court any time soon.  For example, various petitions for certiorari 
have unsuccessfully raised the issue.83 
B.  The Reasonable Jury Problem 
In addition to the constitutional issue, there is a practical issue with 
summary judgment.  On a summary judgment motion, a judge decides 
whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.84  The 
reasonable jury standard appears sensible at first glance.  If a reasonable jury 
could not find for one party, a trial could be useless and arguably the other 
party should win. 
For a judge to determine what a reasonable jury could find, it appears that 
a judge would be required to imagine who would sit on the jury, how the 
jurors would deliberate, and the conclusion that they would reach.  I have 
described this task as impossible for several reasons.  First, jurors’ 
characteristics vary greatly so judges could not accurately predict who would 
sit on a jury.85  To imagine who would sit on the jury, judges would have to 
attempt to cobble together some idea of the characteristics of those who 
would be picked for the jury in a particular area of the country.  Second, even 
if they could do this, they would also need to know these hypothetical jurors’ 
perspectives.86  In a case where I was part of a team that represented the 
plaintiff who accused his employer of race discrimination, we picked a 
person who was a gay and lesbian rights activist.  We felt that he might 
understand the discrimination that our client faced.  However, we do not 
 
 79. See generally Craig M. Reiser, The Unconstitutional Application of Summary 
Judgment in Factually Intensive Inquiries, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195 (2009) (noting that 
summary judgment is often troublingly applied in factually intensive cases). 
 80. See generally id. at 208–19 (noting examples of such factually disputed cases and the 
courts’ willingness to grant summary judgment in them). 
 81. Brief of Professor Suja A. Thomas as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant 
Jerberee Jefferson and Reversal of District Court at 3, Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., No. 3:15-
CV-78-TCB-RGV (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2017); see Thomas, supra note 20, at 144, 163–77. 
 82. See Brief of Professor Suja A. Thomas as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellant Jerberee Jefferson and Reversal of District Court, supra note 81, at 9. 
 83. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18–24, Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 568 U.S. 963 
(2012) (No. 12-226), 2012 WL 3613463, at *18–24; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–17, 
Kramer v. Yokely, 556 U.S. 1152 (2009) (No. 08-923), 2009 WL 181804, at *10–17; Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 10–18, Mendia v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 557 U.S. 905 (2009) (No. 
08-1386), 2009 WL 1304727, at *10–18.  Most of the cases are pro se cases, however, which 
may have affected the certiorari decisions of the Supreme Court. 
 84. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 85. Thomas, Proxy, supra note 14, at 227. 
 86. Id.; Thomas, Fallacy, supra note 14, at 778–80. 
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know what he said in the deliberations.  Each person brings his own 
perspective, and a judge cannot make these determinations accurately.87  
Third, a judge could not figure out how jurors would deliberate together.88  
And fourth, a judge could not decide how individual jurors would ultimately 
vote.89 
Evidence that judges cannot decide what a reasonable jury could find 
includes that actual summary judgment opinions show judges stating what 
they think, not what a jury could think.90  In these cases, judges substitute 
their own evaluation of the evidence for that of the hypothetical jury.  In the 
Supreme Court’s Scott v. Harris91 case, this was seen explicitly.  Each Justice 
stated what he or she saw on a videotape of a car chase and then stated that 
the other Justices and judges who had different opinions were wrong.92  In 
engaging in this discussion that the other Justices and judges had incorrectly 
evaluated the evidence, the Justices were having a discourse on the wrong 
question.  The question was not what each Justice or judge thought, but rather 
what a jury could think.93 
Another indication that a judge decides only what he thinks, not what a 
reasonable jury could find, is the disagreement among judges about whether 
summary judgment should be ordered.  Judges regularly disagree on whether 
a reasonable jury could find for one party.  Again, Scott shows this 
dichotomy.  In that case, one district court judge,94 three circuit court 
judges,95 and one Supreme Court Justice96 found a reasonable jury could find 
for the plaintiff, and eight Justices held the opposite.97 
The idea of what a reasonable jury could find suggests that only one 
reasonable result from a jury exists.  But, if a reasonable jury could find in 
only one way, then it seems likely that the judges would agree on the result. 
 
 87. The naïve realism literature shows we tend to think that others have the same views 
as us and if they do not they are biased or irrational. See, e.g., Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich 
& Lee Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder:  Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self 
Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 781 (2004); see also Daniel J. Simons & Christopher 
F. Chabris, Gorilla in Our Midst:  Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 
PERCEPTION 1059 (1999) (arguing that we can miss events when we do not pay attention). 
 88. Thomas, Proxy, supra note 14, at 225; Thomas, Fallacy, supra note 14, at 771–72, 
778–79. 
 89. Thomas, Proxy, supra note 14, at 227; Thomas, Fallacy, supra note 14, at 778–79. 
 90. Thomas, Proxy, supra note 14, at 227; Thomas, Fallacy, supra note 14, at 769–71. 
 91. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
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respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”); id. at 378 n.5 (“Justice Stevens suggests 
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 93. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 94. See Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *4 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d 
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2018] REFORMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2251 
Moreover, as described previously, factually intensive cases are often 
decided on summary judgment.98  Because they are factually intensive and 
in need of determination, two different groups could very well decide in 
disparate ways.  This result does not make one group unreasonable.  Justice 
John Paul Stevens made a similar point in Scott, stating that certain judges 
were not unreasonable just because they had different opinions of the 
evidence than the majority.99 
All of these issues illustrate that the reasonable jury standard is impossible 
to implement.  Judges decide whether to order summary judgment based on 
their own opinions of the evidence. 
If judges decide what they think of the evidence on a summary judgment 
motion, the question remains whether judges think differently from what a 
reasonable jury could think.  If it would be the same, then it would be 
arguably acceptable to use a judge’s opinion if one accepts the notion of a 
reasonable jury.  Michael Pfautz tried to test this question.100  He examined 
the cases in which a judge had granted summary judgment, the appellate court 
reversed the decision, and a jury decided the case.101  In 25 percent of these 
cases, the jury found in favor of the party against whom the district court had 
ruled on summary judgment.102  In other words, judges and juries decide 
differently at times.  Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel and others have shown 
this as well.103 
C.  The Massaging Facts Problem 
In Salazar-Limon, two Justices determined that a reasonable jury could 
have found excessive force.104  However, other Justices did not believe the 
review of the “factual question” there was appropriate.105  As a result, the 
defendant won even though some believed a reasonable jury could find for 
the plaintiff.106 
The different conclusions about the propriety of summary judgment in the 
case occurred as the result of some Justices and judges viewing the facts 
disparately or, in other words, some “massaging of the facts” taking place.  
The factual question in the case concerned whether a police officer 
reasonably feared for his life and as a result whether he exercised excessive 
 
 98. See supra notes 19, 51, 80 and accompanying text. 
 99. Scott, 550 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If two groups of judges can disagree 
so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, 
it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s 
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 100. See generally Michael W. Pfautz, Note, What Would a Reasonable Jury Do?  Jury 
Verdicts Following Summary Judgment Reversals, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1255 (2015). 
 101. See id. at 1270–95. 
 102. Id. at 1275. 
 103. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) 
(analyzing and explaining that judges and juries often agree but also decide differently). 
 104. See Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1281–82 (2017) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 1277–78 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 106. See id.; id. at 1281–82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
2252 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
force by shooting the motorist.107  The district court judge concluded that the 
motorist offered no evidence against the police officer’s testimony that the 
motorist had turned and reached for his waistband.108  But as Justice 
Sotomayor stated, the motorist had offered such evidence:  he contended that 
the officer fired before he turned toward the officer.109 
Massaging facts occurs when judges who possess the same information 
use it in different manners.  Massaging facts can occur in a number of ways.  
It can occur when a court ignores relevant facts.  It also can happen when 
courts do not consider different ways to view the facts.  In other words, they 
do not take into account the reasonable inferences favoring the party not 
moving for summary judgment.110 
Salazar-Limon is an important example of judges not considering facts and 
reasonable inferences.  Facts determined whether the officer’s actions were 
reasonable.  Instead of recognizing that the statement of the motorist directly 
implied that he did not reach for his waistband, thus disagreeing with the 
officer’s version of the facts, judges stated that no issue of fact existed 
because the motorist had not explicitly stated that he did not reach for his 
waistband.111  It is unlikely given what the motorist already stated that he 
would agree that he reached for his waistband.  Additionally, given that he 
was unarmed,112 the motorist had little reason to reach for his waistband.  In 
fact, just the opposite was true.  He had reason not to move as the police 
officer was armed. 
In one of my cases as a lawyer,113 the court also dissected the evidence and 
massaged the facts.  Our client, a professor of Pakistani descent and of the 
Muslim religion, alleged a university discriminated against her in denying 
tenure to her.114  An ad hoc committee, chaired by a professor of Indian 
descent and of the Hindu religion, recommended denial of tenure, which the 
university ratified.115  The professor who was denied tenure had a graduate 
 
 107. Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 97 F. Supp. 3d 898, 904 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 
826 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017). 
 108. Id. at 909. 
 109. Salazar-Limon, 137 S. Ct. at 1281 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 110. See David L. Lee & Jennifer C. Weiss, Inferences in Employment Law Compared to 
Other Areas of the Law:  Turning the Rules Upside Down, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 791 
(2012).  Judge Bernice B. Donald and her coauthor have argued that if it is not already the 
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instruction to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Hon. Bernice 
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Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 762–63 (2012); see also Randall John 
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Discrimination Implications in the Fifth Circuit, 63 LOY. L. REV. 77, 106–07 (2017) (arguing 
that court resources would be used less if judges construed reasonable inferences in favor of 
the nonmoving party). 
 111. See Salazar-Limon, 137 S. Ct. at 1277–78; Salazar-Limon, 826 F.3d at 278–79; 
Salazar-Limon, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 906. 
 112. Salazar-Limon, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 908. 
 113. See generally Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 114. Id. at 227. 
 115. Id. at 227–29, 237. 
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student of Indian descent who engaged in a conversation with the professor 
who became the chair of the ad hoc committee.116  The student testified that 
the professor who chaired the committee initiated a discussion with her about 
her professor.117  The professor asked the student “how do you feel about 
working with a Pakistani.”118  When the student stated it did not matter to 
her, the professor responded, “‘No, . . . I have heard that [the nontenured 
professor] holds and expresses distinctly anti-Indian views’ and refused to be 
dissuaded.”119  The court concluded that these statements by the tenure 
committee chair “plainly fail[ed] to show discriminatory animus.”120  It 
stated that the first statement was not a disparaging comment about Pakistanis 
and the second was simply a report of another conversation.121  The judge 
explained: 
When the comments are read together, it is apparent that the second was 
made by way of explanation of the first:  When [the graduate student] 
denies having any problem with [the nontenured professor], [the chair] 
says, in effect, “I ask because I have heard that [the nontenured professor] 
expresses anti-Indian views.”  One could infer from this that [the chair] 
assumed [the graduate student], as an Indian, would object to [the 
nontenured professor’s] views and that ethnic tension would result. . . .  
[The nontenured professor] would have a jury conclude that what [the 
chair] meant to say was, ‘”Pakistanis hold anti-Indian views.”  This 
reading, however, cannot be reconciled with the words [the chair] is alleged 
to have used:  “I have heard she holds . . . anti-Indian views.”  Thus, no 
rational juror could conclude that [the chair] harbored discriminatory 
animus on the basis of these comments.122 
Despite the court’s characterization of these facts in deciding to grant 
summary judgment to the university, the facts could be interpreted 
differently.  The chair could have been expressing her views against the 
nontenured professor as a Pakistani and used the second statement to buttress 
her first, regardless of any truth to the statement about anti-Indian views.  
Indeed, the judge ignored the fact that the graduate student herself believed 
that the chair who stopped her had acted discriminatorily against her 
professor, which had caused the graduate student to report the chair’s actions. 
Imagine one employee saying to another, “How do you feel working with 
an African American?  I heard he holds distinctly antiwhite views.”  The 
second does not follow from the first.  Even if one person heard another 
person holds antiwhite views, that is no reason to ask how that first person 
feels working with an African American.  Asking how you feel working with 
an African American could reflect a bias regardless of whether the African 
American had expressed antiwhite views. 
 
 116. Id. at 229. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 236. 
 119. Id. at 229. 
 120. Id. at 236. 
 121. Id. at 236–37. 
 122. Id. 
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The judge in Jalal picked apart other alleged facts.  In her deposition, the 
chair was asked about her work history.123  She testified that thirty years ago 
a less qualified “Muslim” man had been unfairly given a promotion instead 
of her.124  Although the deposition question had nothing to do with religion, 
the chair mentioned religion.  The judge again discounted this fact.  She said, 
“Given that [the chair] stood accused of harboring anti-Islamic bias, it is 
hardly surprising that Hindu/Muslim tension was on her mind when she 
recounted the story.  This statement fails to support even a reasonable 
suspicion, let alone a rational inference, of discriminatory animus.”125 
Despite the court’s insistence that the statement was benign, one could 
argue that the chair was biased—viewing people negatively or positively in 
terms of religion and national origin—and she was offended that, in her view, 
a less qualified—indeed, Muslim—man was promoted over her.  With 
respect to what the judge stated, while religion may have been on the 
professor’s mind, one could at least argue that it should have been the 
opposite; she was accused of discrimination so she should have been 
particularly careful not to exhibit discrimination. 
David Lee and Jennifer Weiss have written about courts not drawing 
reasonable inferences.126  They gave the following example of a case before 
the Seventh Circuit where the court did not draw reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff and excluded facts.127  A female employee had received 
excellent performance reviews.128  Her employer placed her on a 
performance plan after she missed a day of work because of a family 
member’s illness.129  Two months later, she required another day off of work 
to care for another family member’s medical needs.130  Her employer fired 
her that day.131  Another employee asked the decision maker why the other 
employee had been fired.132  The decision maker responded, “Well, I can’t 
say, but Donna’s dealing with personal family issues that she needs to attend 
to.”133 
In reviewing whether summary judgment should have been ordered, Judge 
Richard A. Posner explained away the comment to the coworker.  He said 
that this response was “more polite” or “much nicer” than giving the real 
reasons.134  While a jury could have decided that the decision maker was 
simply being polite or nice, Judge Posner did not have the constitutional 
authority to determine what the decision maker meant by her comment.  Lee 
and Weiss also point out other evidence that was not compelling to Posner—
 
 123. Id. at 229–30. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 237. 
 126. See generally Lee & Weiss, supra note 110. 
 127. Id. at 782–84 (citing Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 128. Id. at 782. 
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so much so that he did not include it in the opinion.135  In a conversation in 
which another coworker asked why the employee had been fired, the decision 
maker said she could not discuss it.136  Although not directly stating she had 
been fired for having to attend to a family member’s medical issues, the 
decision maker again mentioned that the employee had to attend to family 
matters.137  Through the interpretation and exclusion of relevant facts, Judge 
Posner explained away discrimination or massaged the facts. 
The Supreme Court has also engaged in massaging facts.  In Scott v. 
Harris, the Court ignored certain facts and reasonable inferences in favor of 
the plaintiff.  There, a motorist, Harris, fled after being summoned by the 
police to stop for going seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per 
hour speed zone.138  During the chase, an officer, Scott, rammed the 
motorist’s vehicle with his patrol car resulting in the motorist going down an 
embankment and becoming a quadriplegic.139  The motorist sued the officer 
for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.140 
The Supreme Court began the opinion by stating the first step was to 
determine the relevant facts and then said Harris’s “version of events 
(unsurprisingly) differs substantially from Scott’s version.”141  It went on to 
say that there was only one view of the facts—its view—despite the different 
views of the lower courts and the dissenter Justice Stevens.142  The district 
court and court of appeals decisions made clear that no motorists or vehicles 
were in danger, partially based on the decision to block intersections.143  On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court assumed the presence of bystanders.  Its 
opinion began, “Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at 
risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from 
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?”144  Later in the opinion, the 
Court said it was “clear” that Harris’s actions posed imminent danger to 
motorists, any pedestrians, and police officers.145 
These decisions had many other instances of massaging facts.  First, both 
lower courts stated that it was disputed whether Scott hit Harris or Harris hit 
Scott in the shopping center parking lot.146  But the Supreme Court did not 
describe what the lower courts had stated—Scott heading directly toward 
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Harris’s car147—and instead described that Harris hit Scott’s car.148  Second, 
the lower courts said that the underlying crime of going seventy-three miles 
per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour speed zone must be taken into account 
to determine the reasonableness of the officer’s force.149  The Supreme Court 
ignored this fact, despite the fact that culpability factored into its decision on 
whether deadly force was warranted.150  Third, the lower courts pointed 
out151 and the Supreme Court ignored that the officers knew that the vehicle 
had not been reported stolen so that they could find the motorist if they 
abandoned the chase.  Fourth, the Court “omitted” that Harris had been on a 
four-lane road when he had been initially clocked speeding and that the cars 
had likely pulled over because of the sirens, not to avoid being hit by 
Harris.152  Fifth, the Court concluded that the motorist ran red lights153 when 
Justice Stevens stated it was not clear that he ran any lights.154  Sixth, the 
court of appeals and Justice Stevens emphasized the late time of day of the 
chase and the fewer risks due to the center being closed.155  Seventh, both 
lower courts stated that the officer did not have permission to bump the car 
but only to do what was called a precision intervention technique (PIT) 
maneuver.156  While the Supreme Court acknowledged this, it considered this 
fact irrelevant.157  Eighth, the lower courts recognized,158 but the Supreme 
Court did not,159 that police must be trained to perform the PIT maneuver and 
that despite asking for permission to execute it, the officer had not been 
trained to do the PIT maneuver.  Ninth, in ignoring the fact that Scott was 
potentially aggressive toward Harris in the parking lot and that he may have 
been upset that their cars had collided, the Supreme Court failed to evaluate 
fully Scott’s actions to bump Harris’s car to stop the chase.  Instead it stated 
that Scott acted only for the public safety.160 
In all of the examples, courts do not consider or they discount facts that a 
jury could use to find for the nonmoving party.  This type of nonconsideration 
or dissection of the facts undermines the justice system.  Judges state that 
there is no factual dispute and describe what witnesses mean by their 
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statements when it is not possible for judges to know what those people 
meant. 
The Constitution promises that juries shall decide cases in which damages 
are alleged.161  The Constitution also promises that people shall be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.162  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
promises that people shall not be treated differently because of a number of 
characteristics.163  Despite these rights and promises, judges parse the facts 
in many civil rights cases and determine the results instead of juries.164 
III.  THE CONSENSUS REQUIREMENT 
Thus far, I have defined the “summary judgment problem” as the multiple 
layers of legal and logical problems surrounding summary judgment.  First, 
judges can use the procedure in an unconstitutional manner where they order 
summary judgment when disputed issues of fact exist.  Second, judges cannot 
implement the impossible reasonable jury standard underlying summary 
judgment.  Finally, judges massage facts in decisions on summary judgment. 
Will this summary judgment problem be reformed?  The Court continues 
to address constitutional problems affecting the jury in criminal cases 
recognizing the important historical role of the jury.  However, as previously 
described, in the near future, the Supreme Court is unlikely to decide that 
summary judgment is unconstitutional generally or more specifically in a 
factually intensive case.  Also, it is unlikely that the standard underlying 
summary judgment will be changed any time soon.  Finally, although judges 
should emphasize to one another when facts are ignored or otherwise 
massaged, this practice has gone on for some time and no promise of change 
is apparent.  At the same time that the problem persists, summary judgment 
precludes juries from determining facts in many factually intensive cases. 
Various suggestions have been made for the reform of summary judgment.  
For example, Mark W. Bennett, a federal judge, has proposed the elimination 
of summary judgment for five to ten years to assess the benefits and 
detriments of its usage in circumstances where the parties do not consent to 
its use.165  Alternatively, he argues for other changes.  Courts could award 
attorneys’ fees to the nonmoving party when it wins the motion for summary 
judgment.166  Because summary judgment motions are arguably “cost 
free,”167 this shift would reduce significantly the roll-of-the-dice, no-loss 
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nature of summary judgment motions.168  Judge Bennett also advocates that 
summary judgment should not occur in low-dollar-amount and simple cases 
because these cases will be resolved faster upon a trial than summary 
judgment.169  These noteworthy ideas have little support in the current legal 
regime where summary judgment motions are favored. 
Jonathan Remy Nash has argued that appellate courts should review 
denials of motions for summary judgment just for abuse of discretion instead 
of performing de novo reviews where the decision turns in part at least on a 
question of fact.170  This approach would be one way to help remedy the 
summary judgment problem.  However, this solution does not take into 
account that when an appellate court rules that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying summary judgment, at least one judge already thought 
a reasonable jury could have found for the party that lost.  Additionally, this 
reform addresses only the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, not when 
the court actually orders summary judgment. 
Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman proposed another reform 
for summary judgment.171  They recognized that the judge who makes the 
summary judgment decision may have different characteristics from some 
jurors, and they showed that such differences may provoke a myriad of 
opinions about the case’s facts.172  Accordingly, the authors argued that a 
judge should “think hard” before ordering summary judgment if she believes 
that she is privileging her view over a member of a distinct group that she 
thinks may have a different opinion.173  While a laudable idea, it does not 
recognize a fundamental problem about the reasonable jury standard 
underlying summary judgment:  judges cannot actually determine what 
others, including those with different experiences from themselves, would 
think about a case.  Moreover, the authors’ reform idea does not account for 
the value of deliberations.  Let us assume a judge could determine what others 
would think.  A judge would not know how each individual would affect the 
group deliberation and then, how each individual on the jury would vote.174 
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Because of the issues just stated, these noble ideas to reform summary 
judgment, among others, do not remedy the summary judgment problem.  In 
the past, in other contexts, I have proposed the consensus requirement to 
reform summary judgment.175  As described here, the proposal has benefits 
but also can be critiqued.  Under this requirement, summary judgment cannot 
be ordered unless all judges agree that it should be ordered.176  So, if the trial 
court judge denies summary judgment, that order cannot be appealed, and the 
case goes to trial.177  Alternatively, if the trial court orders summary 
judgment but a judge on the appellate court finds against summary judgment, 
then a jury decides the case.178 
If it is not possible to determine what a reasonable jury could find and 
instead a judge decides what he thinks of the evidence, it is rational to permit 
the case to go to a jury trial where one judge thinks there is sufficient evidence 
of the claim.  Presumably the judge is reasonable and some or all members 
of the jury could share his views.  In an unusual case, if the judge is 
unreasonable in a case because of some bias or impediment, the parties 
always can try to disqualify the judge from the case prior to the decision.  
Moreover, if the case goes to a jury, the jury could find against the plaintiff. 
Finally, the consensus requirement is a rational reform given that the 
Constitution does not require a jury to be reasonable.  Instead, juries are 
selected to apply the law to the facts and even to decide against what the law 
is.  Moreover, the Constitution does not assume that every jury will make the 
same conclusion.  So, the reasonable jury standard has been an 
unwarranted—arguably unconstitutional—construct of the judiciary. 
The founders’ choice of the jury, not the judiciary, to decide was a careful 
one.  The choice is now supported by studies.  For example, psychological 
studies show that more eyes are often better than one.179  In inattention 
blindness studies, people often see a fact once it is pointed out to them.180  
So, a juror may be able to convince people to see what happened when none 
of the jurors would have seen this fact on their own. 
Arguments against the consensus requirement include that this 
requirement will result in more denials of summary judgment and thus, more 
trials, where insufficient resources exist for more trials.181  However, if 
summary judgment is ordered less often, cases will not necessarily go to trial.  
They may settle instead.  Also, even if there is a significant increase in jury 
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trials, the Constitution grants a right to a jury trial,182 and sufficient resources 
should be devoted to this right. 
Another contention against requiring consensus for summary judgment 
includes the notion that the judges who rule against summary judgment could 
be wrong.  Although conceivable that a judge who decides against summary 
judgment could be wrong, it is difficult to prove this possibility given the 
inexactness of the standard.  Moreover, if the judge is simply giving his own 
opinion of the evidence, there is no reason to believe that an otherwise 
competent judge is wrong in his determination of the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  Instead, again, the inexactness of determining summary judgment 
and the possibility of a factual issue are highlighted.  Additionally, if the case 
goes to trial after denial of summary judgment by a judge, the jury can check 
the judge’s determination.  Moreover, if the jury decides to favor the 
nonmoving party, like the trial judge originally did, the trial judge can still 
order judgment as a matter of law, checking his original decision.  However, 
by extending the consensus requirement to judgment as a matter of law, one 
appellate court judge could successfully challenge that decision. 
Because in many circumstances the decisions of judges are reviewed, the 
consensus requirement could be criticized because of the lack of review.  
Once a judge decided against summary judgment at the trial or appellate 
level, this decision would not be reviewed.183  Again, if a jury subsequently 
decides the case, it can check the judge’s decision, and the judge can check 
himself on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.184  But one could argue 
that appeal is necessary; a group of judges should check the trial judge’s 
decision against summary judgment.  But appeals occur so that a panel can 
determine whether the district or appellate court judge or judges made a legal 
error.  Here, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, though labeled a 
question of law, is really a factual question, not a legal one, that judges never 
were able to determine in the past, except to order a new jury trial after a jury 
trial.185 
Finally, because reasonableness inquiries occur in many areas of the law, 
one could argue that the reasonable jury standard is no more troublesome.  
The decision of the majority of the judges simply rules.  Without specifically 
assessing those contexts, here in deciding a summary judgment motion, a 
judge attempts to determine whether a factual issue exists.  Where 
disagreement exists on this inexact question, the rational result is for a jury 
to decide the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts employ summary judgment to dispose of cases that supposedly 
have no genuine dispute of material fact where the moving party is entitled 
 
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 183. Thomas, What Happened to the American Jury?, supra note 23, at 29–30. 
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 185. Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English 
Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 698 (2004). 
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to judgment as a matter of law.  As described in previous articles, there is a 
constitutional problem with summary judgment in factually intensive cases, 
and the reasonable jury standard underlying summary judgment is impossible 
to implement.  This Article has described the third problem of judges’ 
“massaging of the facts.”  These three issues constitute the summary 
judgment problem making reform of summary judgment necessary.  A 
rational reform further developed here is the consensus requirement—
precluding summary judgment (or judgment as a matter of law) where one 
judge thinks summary judgment should not be ordered because in these 
circumstances, a factual issue is apparent. 
 
